The 2,600km border fence between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Photograph by Nazar Ul Islam
At least six civilians were killed, and 17 others injured, after Afghan forces resorted to “unprovoked and indiscriminate” firing across the Chaman border on Dec. 11. The incident was reportedly triggered by some individuals from Afghanistan trying to cut a border fence near the village of Lala Mohammad, prompting retaliation from Pakistani troops and a brief closure of the Friendship Gate at the Chaman border-crossing. Subsequently, Afghan forces opened fire into Pakistan, targeting civilian settlements with artillery and mortar shells, according to the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR). A spokesman for Kandahar’s governor, Ataullah Zaid, however told the Associated Press news agency that the clashes were provoked by the “construction of new checkpoints on the Afghan side of the border.”
The situation normalized after a meeting between the neighboring sides, with Defense Minister Khawaja Asif claiming Kabul had “apologized” for the incident. But this was not the first—and is unlikely to be the last—incident of cross-border clashes between Afghan and Pakistani troops.
Not long ago, India aided the West’s overthrow of the Taliban and became the largest regional provider of humanitarian and reconstruction aid to the former Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, providing $650–750 million in funding and supporting various construction projects. Indian objectives in Afghanistan stemmed from a carefully calculated assessment of its domestic, regional, and global interests; countering Pakistan’s influence was, and remains, one of India’s goals. Delhi says its most fundamental goal for Kabul is to “prevent Afghanistan from being used as a base for Pakistani-supported extremists to launch terrorist attacks in India or against Indian interests (for example, against its diplomatic missions in Afghanistan).” By contrast, Pakistan sees Indian involvement in most terror strikes, both within the country and from across the not-so-impenetrable Pak-Afghan border.
In 2016, Indian spy Kulbushan Jadhav was arrested in Balochistan for espionage after entering Pakistan from Iran. In the subsequent years, Pakistan has accused Indian intelligence agencies of trying to establish Daesh-like terrorist organizations in the country, alleging that at one point 30 “Indian Daesh militants” were relocated from India to various camps along the Pak-Afghan border by the rival state’s intelligence agency operatives. Pakistan has also accused Indian ambassadors in Afghanistan of supervising these terrorist activities and providing financial support to TTP and Baloch dissidents. A recent investigation into a bombing in Lahore last year similarly found Indian funding for the terrorists involved.
Given weak internal sovereignty, the Kabul government can hardly control what is happening; its apologetic attitude after such incidents convince no one. The Chaman attack reveals yet another aspect of the way Afghanistan is governed. Pakistan would be well advised to focus more on the border fence it has erected to consolidate the Durand Line and ready for more disturbance that Kabul claims to have no control over.