Husain Haqqani’s 2005 book, Pakistan between Mosque and Military, dwells on religion and the Army as two destabilizing factors in Pakistan’s history. He notes that Pakistan’s secularists have interpreted Quaid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah’s Aug. 11, 1947 speech as a clear statement of intent to build a secular state. Widely publicized at the time in an attempt to quell the communal riots that accompanied Partition, the speech was subsequently been shared in an edited form, with references to religion “having no role in the business of state” taken out. Jinnah’s untimely death within a year of Partition left his successors divided, or confused, over whether to keep religion out of politics or to build on the sentiment generated during the political bargaining for Pakistan. Their ultimate decision was based on-ground political realities.
Ethnic and linguistic divisions
The greatest support for Pakistan actually came from Muslims living in regions that remained a part of India. Migrants from these Muslim-minority regions provided a disproportionate number of the Muslim League’s leadership, senior military officers, and civil servants in Pakistan’s early administration. Haqqani notes that interprovincial rivalries, ethnic and language differences, and divergent political interests of various elite groups had remained dormant prior to Partition but became obstacles after it became a state, notably in framing the Constitution and political consensus-building. India agreed on a constitution in 1949, just two years after Partition, holding its first general election in 1951; by contrast, Pakistan’s first constitution was promulgated in 1956 and abrogated within two years through a military coup d’état.
Immediately after Partition, Pakistan proceeded to indirect elections through provincial assemblies substituted for an appeal to the general electorate. Provincial elections in Punjab and then-NWFP in 1951 were tainted by allegations of administrative interference, while the center was often at loggerheads with the elected leadership of Sindh. The Muslim League, a key player during the fight for independence, was voted out of power in East Pakistan in 1954 amid a rising tide of Bengali nationalism.
National identity as binding factor
Jinnah’s successors sought to patch over these domestic differences along the patterns of pre-independence unity by defining Pakistani identity through religious symbolism and a “common enemy” in India. The dispute over Jammu and Kashmir furthered this, enabling a narrative of India not accepting Partition in “good faith” and attempting to undo it. The fear of dilution of Muslim identity that had defined the demand for Pakistan became its identity, reinforced over time through the educational system and constant propaganda.
The focus on rivalry with India as an instrument of securing legitimacy and authority for the new Pakistani state defined the locus of political power within Pakistan, influencing the relationship between the state and its citizens. Pakistanis were conditioned to believe their nationhood was under constant threat from India, with editorials in the Muslim League newspaper, Dawn, within weeks of independence calling for a “bigger and better-equipped army” to defend the country, laying ground for the prioritization of the military above all else. This also translated into any political ideas and actions seen as diluting Pakistani nationhood being perceived as subversion.
The ideological state
While Jinnah had never spoken of Pakistan as an ideological state prior to Partition, his successors emphasized it. Islam, hostility to India, and the Urdu language were identified as the cornerstones of this new national ideology. Islamic unity was seen as key to combating the potential tide of ethnic nationalism, which could undermine Pakistan’s integrity. Fears persisted over India using ethnic differences among Pakistanis to divide and devour the new country.
The emphasis on Islam as an element of national policy empowered Pakistan’s religious leaders, creating a nexus between the custodians of Islam and the country’s military establishment, civilian bureaucracy, and intelligence apparatus. Inflexibility in relations with India, and the belief that India represented an existential threat to Pakistan, led to maintaining a large military that in turn helped the military assert its dominance in all aspects of life. The search for foreign allies who could pay for the country’s defense and economic growth led to alliances with the West, especially the United States.
The Objectives Resolution
Each element of this policy tripod—religious nationalism, confrontation with India, and alliance with the West—influenced the other. Haqqani notes that at-times this required distortions in convoluted explanations to manage all three, such as India being painted as an enemy of Islam to bolster Pakistan’s Muslim identity. The U.S., meanwhile, was persuaded of Pakistan’s strategic value and its anticommunist credentials to secure weapons to counter the Indians.
Throughout its history, the greatest threats to Pakistan’s central authority came from groups seeking regional autonomy, ethnic rights and political inclusion. Successive Pakistani governments, however, linked these threats to either an India-inspired plan to weaken Pakistan or aid “communists,” even though communist influence in Pakistan was minuscule.
The first formal step toward transforming Pakistan into an Islamic ideological state came in March 1949 when the country’s first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, presented the Objectives Resolution in the constituent assembly. The curious mix of theology and political science provided for democracy, freedom, equality, and social justice “as enunciated by Islam.” Over 75 years since its Partition, Pakistan continues to be defined between the two pillars of military and religion, shaping the country as it stands today.