File photo. Tolga Akmen—AFP
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s unprecedentedly pro-Israel response to the Oct. 7 Hamas attack shocked many, as Delhi has traditionally backed Arab states in pursuit of its nonaligned Middle East policy. However, this process started long before the most recent flashpoint and reflects India’s foreign policy shift toward the U.S. and away from nonalignment. It also signals India’s move “in the direction of a great-power identity,” with some observers noting it would eventually require Delhi engaging with the Israel-Palestine crisis beyond its current status as a South Asian regional power.
The key question for India going forward is how this shift would affect its contacts with the rest of the Middle East. To answer this, one must recognize that India views the situation with regards to how it impacts Delhi’s long-term national and global interests and goals. In the Middle East, this entails “protecting New Delhi’s economic interests, securing uninterrupted access to energy, and reducing the risk of future disruptions and threats” such as the Iraq war, sanctions on Iran, or interventions in Libya and Syria. This process must reckon with New Delhi’s strategic power in relation to both the current hegemon—the U.S.—and looming regional powers such as China.
Complicating India’s relationship with Arab states amidst its support for Israel is how most of the Middle East favors Delhi over Islamabad when comparing the two. Over the years, millions of primarily working class Indians have found employment in the Middle East, boosting remittances, while the region also supplies nearly two thirds of India’s total oil import. Bilateral trade is also flourishing, particularly with the U.A.E. This leaves Modi with a narrow needle to thread, and his actions in the coming weeks and months could well shape how India’s overall position in the Middle East plays out, especially in economies already invested in it.