Screengrab of Imran Khan’s rally in Rawalpindi
There is no ignoring the fact that PTI Chairman Imran Khan’s most pronounced idiosyncrasy as a politician is his colorful language, which has caught on among his growing youthful following. The insults flung at opposition politicians by Khan’s “youthias” (a pejorative term often used for his supporters by critics) is directly related to this new political discourse overtaking Pakistan. His latest sally has offended the Army—which overjoys the ruling coalition led by the PMLN—giving us an inkling into how Khan’s mind works: he believes the ruling parties are afraid if “a strong and patriotic Army chief” were appointed then “he would ask them about looted wealth.”
It is clear Khan wants the Army to “take over,” meaning the current government is removed and he gets another chance to rule Pakistan with its support. He imagines the Army cleaning up the scene for him by removing the current government and punishing them for “corruption”—which he alleges was condoned in the past—thereby putting the country on the right path both internally and externally. One can think about the mind Khan assumes the Army has, which would be reflected in state behavior only after a “strong and patriotic” Army chief has been selected.
Dangerously, the assumption of a “strong” Army chief being responsible for both internal and external changes—and restoration of the state’s honor that went wrong “because of corruption”—imagines the incarceration of all politicians that Khan loathes until they clear themselves of charges of corruption, which they will not, thereby detaining them indefinitely. What no one in Pakistan wastes time analyzing is the kind of change Khan seems to suggest this would trigger to the country’s foreign policy.
After the “corrupt” have been sorted, the “strong” chief—gratefully backed by Khan’s government—would change Pakistan’s foreign policy from one perceived as subordinate to “most immoral power” United States to one based on “real independence” (haqeeqi azadi). This, it is assumed, will immediately lead to a change in Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy, expanding ties with the clergy ruling Kabul, thereby leading to the Taliban’s forays into Pakistan ending and the western border becoming peaceful.
One can’t ignore the generally observed Pakistani anger at living as a poor and “obedient” state because of its subservience to a system presided over by the U.S. in the South Asian region in the 21st century. This leads to the formation of a worldview that sets aside all states who work as “lackeys” of the big power—as evident from Khan’s unwillingness to become “diplomatic” about “pro-Israel” Gulf states where millions of Pakistanis work as expatriate laborers. The fact that the U.S. works closely these days with India to oppose China in the region helps in strengthening the worldview favored by Khan and many “brave” Pakistanis. Alas, great leaders of the past could afford to be isolationists but in today’s “global village,” isolationism simply doesn’t work.