File photo. Brendan Smialowski—AFP
Addressing an event in Tokyo earlier this week, Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari said that Pakistan, as a developing country facing serious economic and environmental challenges, has no time for “Cold War-style bloc politics” that are making a comeback. Referring to the tensions between the U.S. and China in Asia and the Middle East, he said: “We want to focus on delivering jobs and prosperity to our 230 million people, two-thirds of whom are below 30 years of age.” It is hard to buy into this narrative, however, when Pakistan is a key component of China’s access to the Gulf through the Gwadar port. As a consequence, Islamabad is facing a tough time from the U.S., which is increasingly aligning with India to boost its anti-China strategy.
According to the U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington—under both Trump and Biden—has been seeking to leverage its influence to steer states toward downgrading their ties with China. “Biden in particular has stepped up American diplomacy in the region and made new promises of economic and security cooperation,” it noted, harkening the welcome Narendra Modi received on a recent trip to the U.S.
Boosting U.S. apprehensions is China’s “entry” into the Gulf, with Beijing brokering peace between Saudi Arabia and Iran, facilitating Tehran’s re-entry into the global community outside of Washington’s sphere of influence. In a recent op-ed, the Atlantic Council has taken notice of this, advising the U.S. to “proceed thoughtfully in the region; recognize the enduring reality of the Chinese presence, and enhance energy, educational, and economic cooperation with GCC countries when mutually beneficial.”
Key to China’s growing reach in the Gulf is its status as the world’s largest oil importer, with Saudi Arabia alone shipping nearly 88 million tons of fuel to it. Similarly, Oman has historically been the Gulf’s second-largest crude oil exporter to China, only being surpassed by the U.A.E. in 2022 due to Abu Dhabi’s re-export of Russian crude. The U.S. will have to accept this if it wishes to remain engaged with Gulf states, as its traditional policy of seeking a restriction of Chinese dominance is unlikely to find many takers.