Pervez Hoodbhoy spends a portion of his book, Pakistan: Origins, Identity and Future, closely examining the father of Pakistan, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, and his secular aspirations. Most contemporary “religious” Muslim leaders did not like Jinnah’s apparent “secularism” because it was incompatible with their fundamentalism and Hoodbhoy looks at the political path adopted by the founding father during the Pakistan Movement.
Islamic republic
In various speeches, Jinnah discussed securing “liberty, fraternity and equality as enjoined upon us by Islam” (Aug. 25, 1947); “Islamic democracy, Islamic social justice and the equality of manhood” (Feb. 21, 1948); raising Pakistan on “sure foundations of social justice and Islamic socialism, which emphasized equality and brotherhood of man” (March 26, 1948); laying “the foundations of our democracy on the basis of true Islamic ideals and principles” (Aug. 14, 1948); and “the onward march of renaissance of Islamic culture and ideals” (Aug. 18, 1947). “If we take our inspiration and guidance from the holy Quran, the final victory will be ours,” he said on Oct. 30, 1947.
Following the creation of Pakistan, Jinnah also exhorted the new state’s institutions to adhere to Islamic traditions. In an address to the armed forces on Nov. 8, 1947, he urged them to uphold “the high traditions of Islam and our national banner.” Subsequently, on July 1, 1948, he commended the State Bank research organization to evolve “banking practices compatible with Islamic ideals of social and economic life,” and to “work our destiny in our own way and present to the world an economic system based on true Islamic concept of equality of manhood and social justice.”
Tackling the Muslim bigwigs
Due to his perceived secularism, Jinnah had to go the extra mile to secure support for Pakistan from pirs, sajjada nashins, and makhdooms. The pir of Manki Sharif founded an organization of his own, the Anjuman-us-Asafia, which promised to support the Muslim League on the condition that sharia be enforced in Pakistan. Jinnah seemingly agreed to this, assuring the pir that Pakistan’s constitution would be in accordance with Islamic principles, while stopping short of committing himself to sharia law. As a result, the pir declared jihad for Pakistan and ordered members of his organization to support the Muslim League in the 1946 elections.
Jinnah’s refusal to commit to a vision for Pakistan left the country with an uncertain path after his death. Among the questions raised were what Pakistan was to be; whether the Muslim League wanted to create a Muslim-majority state where individuals, whether Muslim or otherwise, would be free to live their lives as in other countries; or whether the state was to be governed by sharia law and what that would entail in the 20th century. Could secular principles apply in the functioning of whatever state he was proposing, or would they run afoul of certain religious principles and precedents?
This confusion was not entirely a surprise. In the early days of the Pakistan Movement, Jinnah’s calculated ambiguity on the Islamic state had led to differences between him and the more religious Muslim Leaguers. Among them was the Raja of Mahmudabad, a major source of financial support to the League and the youngest member of the League’s working committee. He wrote: “I did not see it fit to open its [Muslim League’s] membership to Hindus and Christians. It was then—and remained—a party of exclusion. The only non-Muslim member was a Dalit and follower of Dr. Ambedkar, Jogendara Nath Mandal. As such, he was one of the 96 founding fathers of Pakistan, but in 1950 he submitted his resignation to Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan as a protest against the treatment of Dalits and Hindus in Pakistan. To evade arrest, he fled to India and died there in 1968.”
In his conclusion, Hoodbhoy notes the questions over what Pakistan was intended to be—whether an Islamic state or otherwise—retain their importance because a series of leaders, whether Gen. Ziaul Haq in the 1980s or PTI chief Imran Khan today, have promises Pakistanis an Islamic state on the pattern of the Riyasat-e-Madina. “When Khan finally exits the political scene, others will likely have to promise some such thing. It is difficult to conceive of a future leader staying clear of religious sloganeering,” he adds.