File photo. Abdul Majeed—AFP
While condemning the incursions of terrorists across the Durand Line, the interim government of Afghanistan has alleged that its forces killed 18 Pakistani citizens belonging to the Daesh militant group over the past year, counter-accusing Islamabad of failing to prevent militancy. It further claimed dozens of Daesh militants from Pakistan were detained in Afghan prisons. The statement, by spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid, followed an address by Chief of Army Staff Gen. Asim Munir highlighting the “involvement of Afghan nationals” in terrorist incidents within Pakistan, noting its adverse impact on regional peace and stability. Pakistan’s Foreign Office, likewise, issued a statement confirming the role of Afghan terrorists in a terrorist attack targeting a military garrison in Zhob, Balochistan.
On the face of it, the statement by the Taliban’s spokesman ignores the reality of the population shifts that occurred after the U.S.-led NATO forces invaded Afghanistan in 2001. Many terrorists, seeking “jihad,” crossed the Durand Line to set up camp in the neighboring nation, often with the full support of the Taliban seeking to shore up their numbers. In Pakistan, meanwhile, there is widespread acknowledgment of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) including Pakistanis within its ranks, but the intent of its condemnations is to draw Kabul’s attention to how its territory continues to be used to facilitate terrorists. Afghan state media, last week, broadcast a bromide by Kabul’s defense minister that “fighting outside Afghanistan was not religiously sanctioned jihad but rather war, which had been forbidden by Supreme Leader Haibutullah Akhundzada.”
The Pak-Afghan situation is a direct consequence of “ungoverned spaces” in the border regions of both countries, resulting from their inability to impose the state’s writ. The possible security implications of this lack of writ of the state are clear: a perceived inability to provide physical security to the people and lack of governance. These conditions facilitate safe havens for terrorists, requiring measures such as border-fencing. This is a good first step, but remains insufficient. Much more needs to be done to enforce the state’s writ in parts of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan to convince local elements to “cooperate” with security forces and close to door to cross-border movement that negates the statehood of Pakistan.